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 The release of the November fifth employment numbers by the federal 
government did not leave Americans with confidence about their employment as the 
nation heads into the second holiday season during this recession. The rate of 
unemployment held steady at 9.6 percent. Yet, there is one area of american job market 
that has some glimmer of hope in it. Johns Hopkins University reported in September 
2010 that the non-profit sector is the only place in the American job market that seems to 
be having any steady growth over the past few years.
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It is easy to forget that the non-profit sector makes up a robust slice of the 
American economic pie. Far too often the only image that one can conjure of  a non-
profit is that of  a young, early twenty-something adult standing on a street corner trying 
to arouse our senses of morality for his or her particular cause. On the other hand, it is 
seemingly difficult to conjure up images of the accountants who work for PETA. Yet, 
those who work in the non-profit industry all have word of caution for the would-be 
jobseekers: You will not get rich working for a non-profit.  
Is this statement true? If it is true then it leads to the inevitable question: Why 
would anyone accept lower wages? This is particularly troubling when drawing upon 
some basic economic framework: higher wages create a higher income, which means 
more acquisition of goods and services, which allows individuals to obtain higher utility 
in their lives. Thus, no rational individual would choose to put themselves in a lower 
economic class and subsequently there would be no one employed at a non-profit.  
                                                 
1
 (Bilzor 2010) 
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With a bit of investigation it becomes clear that labor economics supplies several 
reasons why an individual would choose to accept a lower wage. Some of these reasons 
are: the atmosphere at that particular job, some sort of utility gained from working, some 
benefits package associated with that job, etc. Economists studying this phenomenon 
have been focusing their research on proving that the reasons hypothesized correlate with 
the lower wages actually observed in the for profit and non-profit industries. The 
dominant literature states that individuals take lower wages because of particular 
phenomenon called the donative labor hypothesis.  
From the very basic overview above, there are three objectives in this paper. First 
is to show the existence of wage differentials. The second objective is to investigate the 
reasons why individuals would take lower wages at a non-profit and try to show that 
these reasons exist empirically. Thirdly, to prove or disprove the postulate that the 
donative labor hypothesis is not as important as other factors when explaining wage 
differentials. 
To facilitate achieving these goals, this paper will begin by laying out the 
economic theory behind wages. Then it will move to looking at the current research on 
the topic of wage differentials, which will be followed by an econometric model.  Lastly, 
to conclude there will be a discussion of the results. 
Labor Theory 
Firstly, there needs to be a discussion about economic labor theory, as it provides 
most of the backbone to this paper. Significantly, standard labor theory assumes that all 
jobs are the same. Each individual worker is indifferent to working between one firm and 
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any another, assuming wages are the same. Although this is nice for simple modeling, we 
want to go a bit deeper. Thus we must amend our model. What will happen when a 
worker must choose between two firms offering the same wage? The answer requires a 
more realistic model, which takes into account the characteristics of the particular job 
when an individual considers taking that particular wage rate.  These characteristics can 
be things the individual considers good or bad characteristics. For example, a risk adverse 
worker would demand a higher wage rate of a job that is unsafe, compared to a similar 
job that does not exhibit those characteristics.  
The characteristics that we will examine are the ones that increase utility. The 
reason for this is because people employed by non-profits must gain some sort of utility 
to make up for the fact that they receive diminished wages relative to those received at a 
comparable job. With the increased utility received from working at the non-profit, this 
creates incentives such that some individual will choose to work for the non-profit firm. 
In order to know what these characteristics are, we will turn to scholarly literature 
surrounding this topic. 
Literature Review 
Interest in wage differentials can trace its scholastic origins to Handsmann’s 1980 
article on the non-profit sector. Since then, two dominant camps have developed to 
explain the wage differentials. 
The first major explanation is the donative labor hypothesis. This particular theory 
states that employees willingly take a pay cut in order to donate to the non-profit. The 
reason why an individual would do this is because they believe that the particular product 
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produced by the non-profit is different from that in the for-profit sector. Therefore, the 
non-profit serves to correct a market failure of some sort.  
The second category of explanation for wage differentials does not have an easily 
referable name similar to the donative labor hypothesis. Simply, this theory states that 
there are a number of observable and unobservable differences in the characteristics of 
the non-profit job. Some of these characteristics are quality of life, decreased pressure to 
cut costs, a particular set of benefits associated with that job (such as education benefits 
at a university), and anything else that could be used to describe increased utility.  
There have been empirical articles written about wage differentials as early as 
1983. Yet, as Christopher Ruhm and Carey Borkoski pointed out in their 2003 article, 
there have not been many definitive results from these studies.
2
 Examining the most 
recent studies available we can see that the scholarly literature lacks several aspects, 
which this paper brings to this topic. 
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 (Ruhm and Borkoski, Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector 2003, 995) 
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Table 1: Literature Review Table 
Study Data  Results Comments 
Laura Leete 
(2000) 
Five Percent 
Public Use 
Microdata 
Sample of 
1990 census 
Postulated that intrinsically 
motivated people work for 
non-profits and further 
showed wage differentials 
between the for-profit and 
non-profit industries. The 
areas which had the most 
concentrated differentials 
were in the managerial and 
professional industries. 
There is no inclusion of any other 
factors other than standard social 
capital explanation. This article 
does do an excellent job of 
breaking down the workers by 
race, occupation, and industry. 
Laura Leete 
(2001) 
Five Percent 
Public Use 
Microdata 
Sample of 
1990 census 
Negative differentials in legal 
services, broadcasting, 
publishing, entertainment, 
elementary and secondary 
schools, job training firms, 
vocational training firms, and 
research facilities could be 
explained by the donative 
labor hypothesis. While the 
paper rejects an economy 
wide donatives labor 
explanation for all non-
profits. 
Breaks it down by industry, 
sector, and whole economy.  Yet, 
does not have any sort of proxy 
to measure some of the intrinsic 
utility gained from employment 
(i.e. benefits, working 
environment, etc.) 
Christoph-
er J. Ruhm 
& Carey 
Borkoski 
(2003) 
1994-1998 
Current 
Population 
Survey 
Outgoing 
Rotation 
Groups. 
Specifically 
25-55 year 
olds. 
Disproves the dontative labor 
hypothesis, postulating that 
the lower non-profit wages 
are due to most of these 
firms situated in low paying 
industries. Further the 
transition from non-profit to 
for profit and vise-versa 
there are very little changes 
to earnings. 
This paper does an excellent job 
at showing not only industry 
break-downs over time but also 
tracking worker movement 
between industries. What is 
lacking is any sort of inclusion of 
intrinsic and hard to observe 
factors of the job. 
Lester M. 
Salamon & 
S. Wojeiech 
Sokolowski 
(2005) 
The 
Quarterly 
Census of 
Employment 
and Wages 
Program 
1995-2003 
data 
Non-profit wages were 
generally lower. Although, in 
industries where non-profits 
compete with for profit 
industries, the wages in non-
profits are larger. 
The authors do not make any 
mention of comparing non-
human capital attributes of the 
workers, nor the jobs in this 
study. 
Haruko 
Noguchi & 
Satoshi 
Statistical 
Survey on 
Nursing 
Non-profit wage premium in 
Japan’s long-term care 
market. Certain factors such 
Tried to filter out unobservable 
qualities of each job via 
Heckman's two-stage approach.  
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Shimizutani 
(2005) 
Home 
Employee 
2000 data. 
as worker’s age contribute to 
said premium. 
Included things like benefits and 
whether the individuals received 
healthcare. 
Matthias 
Benz (2005) 
American 
National 
Longitudinal 
Study of 
Youth years 
1994, 1996, 
1998, and 
2000. Also 
British 
Household 
Panel Survey 
from 1991-
1999 
Found that employees are 
more satisfied with their 
work, and that working for a 
non-profit was the strongest 
statistically significant 
variable. Leading the authors 
to postulate that non-profit 
firms attract altruistic people 
This data incorporates all of the 
possible standard human capital 
explanations for wage 
differentials. What is lacking is 
anyway to tell which industries 
were involved in these surveys or 
if the effects varied between 
industries. 
Thomas 
Cornille, 
Ronald 
Mullis, Ann 
Mullis, and 
Michael 
Shriner 
(2005) 
Surveyed 558 
different 
faith based, 
non-profit, 
and for profit 
childcare 
centers in 
one south 
eastern 
state. 
 Primarily used survey 
questions to investigate 
intrinsic attributes of 
childcare centers. These 
survey questions covered 
benefits, education, and  
work environment. They 
found that there was no 
difference in satisfaction 
between for profit and non-
profit workers. Further, 
Cornille et al. found that they 
both received similar working 
conditions 
This data only looks at education 
and none of the other standard 
factors when used to describe 
wage differentials.  
 
As illustrated in Table 1, the seven most recent articles on wage differentials have 
made no attempt to use any data that is before the economic crisis. In addition, it becomes 
evident that most of the variables used in these studies do not include any sort of 
measurement of non-standard human capital variables. Thus this paper attempts to lend to 
the debate about wage differentials by using an updated data source and include some 
variables to try and measure the other intrinsic utility producing aspects of employment. 
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Data 
 The particular data that were used for this paper are from the 2009 American 
Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample (ACM PUMS). This data were 
collected via the US Census Bureau’s program called DataFerrett, which is a new data 
analysis and extraction tool. Out of the 376 possible answers to the survey, this paper 
focuses on eight responses. Those responses are: age, race, wage/salary, income, sex, 
insurance through a current or former employer/union, the particular industry that the 
individual worked in, the educational attainment, and the class of worker. All of these 
variables are being used to try and predict wage/salary income. 
 From the eight explanatory variables: sex, age, race, and educational attainment 
are the standard human capital explanations for wage and salary income. It would be 
expected to see that being female and non-Caucasian have a negative effect on wages, 
while education and age should have a positive effect. The remaining variables are 
intended to explain some of the different hypotheses behind wage differentials.  
Model 
 In trying to measure non-profit wages, we have identified eight main variables 
and had to alter the responses from the survey. From the raw data, non-profit wages, for-
profit wages, and industry level non-profit and for profit wages were created. 
The class of worker variable describes what type of firm the respondent is 
employed at. Answers to this could be:  private firm, non-profit, any level of government, 
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self-employed, working for family without pay, or unemployed. This variable will be 
used to help us distinguish non-profit wages as well as non-profit industries. To achieve 
this, the model will have to create a dummy variable where one represents non-profit and 
zero represent for profit. Then using these transformed variables to filter out for profit 
and non-profit wages 
The purpose behind choosing the industry variable is to try to prove the donative 
labor hypothesis. If the hypothesis is correct, then a non-profit industry should be 
statistically significant. This is because the product that is offered, as well as the market 
failure that is corrected by the non-profit is important to the individual. Thus this 
particular variable should have a negative effect on the wage for non-profit industry if the 
donative hypothesis is correct. 
 Out of the hundreds of different industries that were listed in the responses for 
the AMC PUMS survey, only 8 particular industries were chosen. The eight industries 
are: medical and hospitals, museums/art galleries/entertainment, medical nursing care 
facilities, individual and family social services, community food and housing services, 
childcare and daycare services, religious organizations, and periodical/book/directory 
publishing companies. This particular collection is supposed to represent both social and 
human services, commonly referred to 501 (c) 3 organizations, as well as other sector, of 
the non-profit industry. 
The last variable chosen was whether or not the individual received insurance 
from his or her job. This will help represent the benefits that the individual can receive by 
working for a non-profit. Although health insurance is not the only benefit that an 
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individual can receive, it was the only one that was available with the data. This 
particular variable should be negative as an increase in benefits would be acceptable in 
place of decreased wages. 
 Using the data set and industry classification information, it was possible to create 
a set of dummy industry variables. Since all of the responses were what industry the 
individual was employed in, eight separate categories were created for each different job. 
A one denotes them participating in the job that the category is measuring and a zero for 
every other industry. These dummy industries are: Hospitals, Art, Nursing, Indivserv, 
Commserv, Childcare, Religious, and Publishing. Then these eight variables were copied 
and transformed using the class of worker information to create dummy non-profit 
industry variables, e.g. Non-Profit Hospitals, Non-Profit Art, etc. 
 Lastly the sex, insurance, and race variables were turned into dummy variables. A 
one denotes a worker that was female, received insurance from their job, and is not white 
in the data set.  
Analysis 
In order to try and understand wage differentials, this paper has fabricated four 
different types of models from the survey data. The four models are: one that tests the full 
market, one that sorts non-profit and for-profit wages, one that tests for the donative labor 
hypothesis, and the last model that separates non-profit wages and for-profit wages into 
the industries selected for this study. 
10 
 
The purpose of creating four separate models is to try and get a deeper 
understanding of wage differentials by approaching it in several ways. Logically the first 
model to examine is the full market wage model. 
Model Set 1 
The full market model measures all the wages from the PUMS survey and applies 
the standard human capital explanation; which are age, education, sex, and race. Race 
and sex are dummy variables in this model; with a one denoting the individual being a 
female and non-Caucasian, respectively. The last variable that was included was a 
dummy variable that gave a value of one if the individual worked for a non-profit.  
It is important to address why sex and race are included in this full market model, 
even though these are not standard explanations for wage differentials. The reason why 
these variables were included is because when initial tests were done without these 
variables the model lacked explanatory power. Thus, since these factors are 
acknowledged to affect wages garnered by individuals, the decision was made to include 
them for the sake of explanatory power. 
 What is intended to be uncovered by this model is, when looking at the economy 
as a whole, does working for a non-profit actually decrease your wages? This is an 
important first question to be answered. As illustrated in the literature review, some 
economists postulate that there is no difference between wages received in the for-profit 
and non-profit industries. 
 Moving on to Table 2 we can see that, as predicted the COW (class of worker) 
variable has a negative coefficient. Thus, as we set out to prove, non-profit workers do 
make less on average in the market as a whole. Further, the coefficients on sex, race, 
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education obtainment, and age, behave as would be expected. What can also be observed 
from Table 2 is that all of the variables, excluding our non-profit variable, are significant 
at a .001 level. Lastly, what needs to be examined is the explanatory power of the model 
and if it has any symptoms of autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, or multicollinearity.  
 
Table 2: Full market Test 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Coefficient 
Significant 
at level VIF 
WAGE 33764.59 44088.65       
AGEP 44.64 14.829 215.684 0.001 1.016 
SEX 0.77 0.419 -15669.7 0.001 1.016 
RACE 0.24 0.429 1620.222 0.001 1.026 
ED 18.89 2.977 4875.83 0.001 1.044 
COW 0.37 0.484 -485.036 0.05 1.055 
 
When looking at Table 3 it is evident that this model does not have a large amount 
of explanatory power. Further, it would not be expected from this type of data to have 
any issue with autocorrelation or multicollinearity. The model does not show signs of 
being plagued by either of the aforementioned ailments. This is illustrated by a Durbin-
Watson statistic very close to 2 and variance inflation factor well below 4. Therefore, the 
only model-skewing affliction to be tested for is heteroskedasticity. 
Table 3: Full Market Predictiveness 
R2 Adjusted R2 Durbin-Watson 
0.143 0.143 1.954 
 
In order to test for heteroskedasticity, a normal probability plot of regressions was 
preformed. Labeled Table 4 in this paper, it can be seen that data points oscillate off of 
the line, indicating that there are issues with heteroskedasticity in the model. Since the 
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data are cross sectional wage data, it was very likely that this problem would be incurred. 
What this means for this model is that it is a possibility that the variables appear more 
significant than they actually are. Yet, this will not be a problem since the only concern 
of this model was to show that there is negative effect associated with working for a non-
profit. 
Table 4 
 
Model Set 2  
The second model set separates the for-profit and non-profit wages from the data 
sample and observes how the standard human capital variables affect the two sectors. 
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Thus there were two models created for the non-profit and for- profit industries. Both of 
these models measured wages against age, sex, education, and race for the two industries. 
 
When comparing Tables 5a and 5b there are two conclusions that are immediately 
evident. First, the mean in the for-profit industry is larger by five thousand dollars. This 
fact confirms the conclusion from the previous model; namely, that wages in the non-
profit industry are less than those received in the for-profit industry. A subsequent even 
more intriguing thought is that the means for age, sex, education, and race are all 
equivalent in both sectors. This equality of means leads to an interesting conclusion about 
the data set: an average individual has similar amounts of human capital and diversity in 
both industries.  
The second observation that can be drawn comes from observing the two tables 
and the coefficients of each model. The coefficients on education and race in the for-
profit industry are much larger than in the non-profit. Surprisingly, age and sex are larger 
in the non-profit industry than in the for-profit industry. 
Table 5a: For-Profit 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Coefficient 
Significant at 
level VIF 
For Profit 
Wages 19655.7781 36866.12323    
Age 44.64 14.829 50.804 0.001 1.005 
Sex 0.77 0.419 -6141.306 0.001 1.017 
Ed 18.89 2.977 2315.575 0.001 1.009 
Race 0.24 0.429 4671.828 0.001 1.021 
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Table 5b: Non-Profit 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Coefficient 
Significant at 
level VIF 
Non-Profit 
Wages 14108.8145 33754.11855     
Age 44.64 14.829 163.301 0.001  1.005 
Sex 0.77 0.419 193.92 0.001  1.017 
Ed 18.89 2.977 27.465 0.001  1.009 
Race 0.24 0.429 190.254 0.001  1.021 
 
 When looking at Tables 6a and 6b, we see that neither model has much 
explanatory power. Though, when comparing the two adjusted R
2
, it can be seen that the 
non-profit model has slightly more explanatory power.  
 What can be gained from these two models is that there is a need to add in 
additional factors to try and explain wages. Whether it is in the for-profit industry or the 
non-profit industry, the simple human capital explanatory variables are not enough.   
Table 6a: For-Profit Predictiveness 
R2 Adjusted R2 Durbin-Watson 
0.043 0.043 1.939 
 
Table 6b: Non-Profit Predictiveness  
R2 Adjusted R2 Durbin-Watson 
0.078 0.078 1.940 
 
Model Set 3 
 As illustrated in the second model set, there is a need for the inclusion of other 
variables. Thus, model set three gets at the core question that was posed at the beginning 
of this paper, which is testing the donative labor hypothesis.  
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 In testing for the donative labor hypothesis there were thirteen variables examined 
against non-profit wages. Five of the variables were age, sex, race, education, a dummy 
variables denoting insurance provided by the job, and eight dummy variables 
representing the different non-profit industries selected to be studied. As mentioned 
above, these industries were arts, publishing, community services, individual services, 
childcare, education, and religious organizations. Of these variables, we would expect the 
coefficients on everything excluding education and age to be negative. 
 The first thing that is notable from the model was the overall explanatory power is 
40 percent of the data, as depicted by Table 7. Normally this would be a cause for 
concern, yet there are two reasons why this is actually a very good number. First, is that 
most of the empirical literature on this topic have models that range from 30 to 40 percent 
explanatory power. The second reason is that, by omission, this model does not have 
every possible factor that could be used to explain non-profit wages. Thus the fact that 40 
percent is explained by essentially the donative labor hypothesis seems to not only show 
its importance, but also hint that it is certainly not the most important factor in explaining 
non-profit wages. 
 Turning to Table 8 we see that all of the variables are statistically significant at 
the .001 level. Though what is troubling is that the insurance variables, all of the industry 
variables, and race are not negative as was initially predicted. 
Table 7: Non-Profit Wages Predictiveness  
R2 Adjusted R2 Durbin-Watson 
0.404 0.404 1.972 
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Table 8: Non-Profit Wages  
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Coefficient 
Significant at 
level VIF 
NP Wages  14108.8145 33754.11855        
Age 44.64  14.829  68.063 0.001 1.027 
Insurance .72  .448 4125.61 0.001 1.093 
Race .24  .429 743.558 0.001 1.034 
Ed 18.89  2.977 1319.29 0.001 1.107 
Sex .77   .419 -7910.485 0.001 1.051 
NP Art .088 .09342 24000.084 0.001 1.009 
NP Childcare .0286 .16673 15755.395 0.001 1.02 
NP 
Community 
Service .0069 .08269 22106.665 0.001 1.006 
NP Hospitals .1665 .37256 51854.385 0.001 1.114 
NP Individual 
Service .0433 .20362 25911.583 0.001 1.028 
NP Nursing .0255 .15762 28884.931 0.001 1.016 
NP Publishing .0016 .03985 39836.949 0.001 1.002 
NP Religious .0931 .20062 19516.108 0.001 1.119 
 
 
We can see from table 8 that the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.972, which signals 
no autocorrelation. Similarly, the check for multicollinearity shows from the VIF column 
on table 7 that none of the variables are exhibiting multicollinearity. 
 Yet, when looking at table 9 of the normal probability plot of regressions, it can 
be extrapolated that there is a huge issue with heteroskedasticity. While the usual 
transformation to be applied to a model exhibiting this weakness is to create a weighted 
linear regression this was not done. The reason being that since this is data reflects the 
entire population of the United States it would be hard to divide it by a coherent factor. 
Thus, the only option that is left is to make a log-linear model. The new log-linear model 
is summarized in tables 10 & 11 
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Table 9: Non-Profit Wages Probability Plot 
 
When looking at the transformed model it is evident that two important events 
have happened. First, is that the models predictive power has decreased to about 35 
percent. Secondly, the coefficients on the variables have changed to be in line with the 
theory. Further, it seems that non-profit childcare and non-profit religious firms have the 
largest coefficients, while publishing and nursing have the smallest effect upon non-profit 
wages. Lastly, non-profit hospitals have been excluded because of a lack of non-zero 
wages from those who work in the non-profit industry, reported by the data. 
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Table 10: Natural Log of Non-Profit Wages 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Coefficient 
Significant at 
level VIF 
LN NP Wages 10.1105  1.20923        
Age  45.94 14.300  0.012 0.001 1.037 
Insurance  .80 .400  0.572 0.001 1.127 
Race  .18 .385  0.089 0.001 1.029 
Ed  19.59 2.656  0.132 0.001 1.077 
Sex  .72 .451  -0.34 0.001 1.101 
NP Art .0230 .14995 -0.856 0.001 1.035 
NP Childcare .0741 .26197 -1.083 0.001 1.123 
NP 
Community 
Service .0176 .13159 -0.673 0.001 1.033 
NP Individual 
Service .1130 .31663 -0.558 0.001 1.107 
NP Nursing .0671 .25024 -0.308 0.001 1.006 
NP Publishing .0042 .06482 -0.029 0.001 1.332 
NP Religious .2440 .42952 -0.984 0.001 1.029 
 
Table 11: Natural Log of Non-Profit Wages Predictiveness 
R2 Adjusted R2 Durbin-Watson 
0.353 0.353 1.982 
 
Turning to the Normal Probability Plot, labeled Table 12, it is evident that the 
model has become more normally distributed. That said it still exhibits signs of 
heteroskedasticity. This is somewhat to be excepted since the transformation that was 
used is not the strongest when dealing with this type of error. 
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Table 12: Natural Log Probability Plot 
 
From this model what conclusion can be drawn is that lower wages at a non-profit 
can be attributed to the donative labor hypotheis. Yet, because the insurance varible was 
statistically significan in both models coupled with the fact that the model only truly 
predicted about 35 percent of the data leads to the conclusion that there is something to 
the second hypothesis posed by the literature. This conclusion bring out the fourth and 
last set of models, which try to understand just how impactful the donative labor 
hypothesis truly is at an industry level. 
 
20 
 
 
Model Set Four 
Model set four is very different from the three previous model sets. Model set 
four seeks to examine the donative effect upon each individual industry. The motivation 
behind this model set is to try and examine the question of if certain industries are more 
affected by the donative labor hypothesis than others. Thus, what was done in this model 
set was to separate all of the wages into for profit and non-profit for each of the industries 
in the data set. This resulted in fifteen separate models, rather than sixteen, because there 
were no for profit religious organizations.  
The dependent variables of for profit wages of an industry were measured against 
age, sex, race, insurance, and education. Then a mirror model of the non-profit wages for 
that particular industry was created using the same variables as the for profit model, with 
the addition of a dummy variable that indicated its non-profit status. Similar to the 
previous model set, if the donative labor hypothesis is correct, then this non-profit 
indicator should be statistically significant and have a negative coefficient. 
 As with all of the other previous models, the means and standard deviations on 
the variables of age, race, sex, and level of education were constant throughout all of the 
models. Further, the dummy variables for insurance provided by the employer had a 
mean value of 0.72 throughout all of the models. This signals that most of the employers 
provided insurance as a benefit. 
 One of the first conclusions that can be drawn from these models is that the 
industry for profit models have extremely poor explanatory power. The lowest of these 
are the childcare and community service industries with an adjusted R
2
 of 0.001 and 0, 
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respectively. All of the non-profit models have strong explanatory power when compared 
to the previous model set. As seen from Table 13, the model with the lowest explanatory 
power is the non-profit art industry and the highest is the publishing industry. 
 This is particularly interesting because of the fact that the strongest model has 
only five percent explanatory power. The lack of explanatory power is troubling, 
especially because for profit wages should be mostly explained by the standard human 
capital variables included in the model. The fact that these standard variables do not even 
cover ten percent of the data observed indicates the importance of looking beyond the 
easily measurable human capital explanations. 
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Table 13: Predicitveness of Each Industry Model 
Model R Adjusted R2 Durbin-Watson 
For Profit Hospital 
Wages 0.242 0.058 1.937 
Non-Profit Hospital 
Wages 0.659 0.434 1.969 
For Profit Art Wages 0.104 0.011 1.945 
Non-Profit Art Wages 0.624 0.39 1.971 
For Profit Nursing 
Wages 0.064 0.004 1.956 
Non-Profit Nursing 
Wages 0.699 0.489 1.996 
For Profit Individual 
Services Wages 0.058 0.003 1.936 
Non-Profit Individual 
Service Wages 0.696 0.484 1.974 
For Profit Community 
Services Wages 0.019 0.00 1.987 
Non-Profit Community 
Services Wages 0.667 0.445 2.001 
For Profit Childcare 
Wages 0.094 0.009 1.954 
Non-Profit Childcare 
Wages 0.647 0.419 1.991 
Non-Profit Religious 
Wages 0.68 0.462 1.993 
For Profit Publishing 
Wages 0.092 0.008 1.943 
Non-Profit Publishing 
Wages 0.714 0.51 1.993 
 
 The next observation from this model set is derived from the means. Observing 
the results from Table 14 illustrates that the means of all non-profits are lower than the 
for profit firms in every industry; the only exception is in the community services 
industry. Interestingly, the individual services and hospital industries exhibit the closest 
means when comparing the for profit and non-profit wages. Further, the publishing and 
nursing industries exhibit the largest differences with at least a one thousand dollar 
difference between the for profit and non-profit firms. The conclusion that can be drawn 
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from this table is that the original intuition of the previous models is correct: non-profit 
workers make less on average. What is surprising is the varying degree of the difference 
between the industries examined in this paper. 
Table 14: Descriptive Statics of Dependent Variables for Each Industry Model 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
For Profit Hospital Wages 12745.4506 33654.51670 
Non-Profit Hospital Wages 9145.4543 31553.89574 
Non-Profit Hospital  0.1665 0.37256 
For Profit Art Wages 554.9700 5385.39489 
Non-Profit Art Wages 235.9772 4013.25629 
NP Art 0.0088 0.09342 
For Profit Nursing Wages 2705.8175 11607.82093 
Non-Profit Nursing Wages 720.6132 6387.21623 
Non-Profit Nursing 0.0255 0.15762 
For Profit Individual Services 
Wages 1416.3992 9144.01126 
Non-Profit Individual Service 
Wages 1190.7395 8072.45453 
Non-Profit Individual Service 0.0433 0.20362 
For Profit Community Services 
Wages 54.2633 1806.05531 
Non-Profit Community 
Services Wages 160.6318 2896.15407 
Non-Profit Community 
Services 0.0069 0.08269 
For Profit Childcare Wages 1001.8245 5828.43347 
Non-Profit Childcare Wages 426.8096 3848.06092 
Non-Profit Childcare 0.0286 0.16673 
Non-Profit Religious Wages 2159.2525 10052.74025 
Non-Profit Religious 0.0931 0.29062 
For Profit Publishing Wages 1177.0526 12400.47955 
Non-Profit Publishing Wages 69.3376 2433.95714 
Non-Profit Publishing 0.0016 0.03985 
Age 44.64 14.829 
Race 0.24 0.429 
Sex 0.77 0.419 
Insurance 0.72 0.448 
Education 18.89 2.977 
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 Not surprisingly, model set four did not exhibit any signs of autocorrelation or 
multicollinearity. Similar to the previous model set, all of the models displayed 
significant issues with heteroskedasticity. Unlike the other models, the natural log 
transformation can not be applied to these model sets. This is because if one attempts to 
perform a natural log transformation, the dummy variables for non-profit status get 
excluded. The reason for this restriction is that the non-profit dummy variable in the data 
set will be equal to 1. Thus, this will cause the program to fail to run because it sees the 
equation as having two constants in the equation, which causes perfect collinearity. The 
result of the inability to deal with heteroskedasticity means that the standard errors of the 
variables will be biased. What this means is that significance tests on the coefficients are 
potentially biased. 
Tables 15a through 15h display all of the coefficients of each of the nine 
industries. Yet, it is important to note that there is no table displaying the for profit 
religious industry. This is because, by definition of US tax code, there are no such 
organizations. 
It is much harder to make generalizations from the information in Table 15. The 
reason is that there seems to be no common theme in the coefficients. For example, the 
theory dictates that the coefficients for sex, race, insurance and non-profit status be 
negative. From Table 15, it can be seen that there are very few instances where any of the 
variables display the correct sign, let alone the proper sign happening more than once in a 
particular industry model.  
What can be said about Table 15 is that in the for profit industry every variable, 
other than race, was not statistically significant at least once. In the non-profit industry, 
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only sex and race status were statistically insignificant. Further, there was never any 
similarity in what variables were not statistically significant across industries. For 
example, in the for profit model of the publishing industry, age was statistically 
insignificant while in the non-profit model, only race was statistically insignificant. 
Interestingly, when looking at the for profit side of the industries, age is 
statistically insignificant the most often, even at the 90 percent confidence interval. By 
comparison, sex was statistically insignificant twice, while race was insignificant three 
times at the 90 percent confidence interval. 
Table 15a: Hospital Industry Coefficients 
Variables 
of Model 
FP 
Hospitals 
Wage Coefficient 
Significance 
level VIF 
 Variables 
of Model 
NP 
Hospitals 
Wage Coefficient 
Significance 
level VIF 
Age 42.969 0.001 1.005 Age 42.88 0.001 1.007 
Race 4621.214 0.001 1.023 Race 617.651 0.001 1.024 
Sex -4785.205 0.001 1.009 Sex -5047.09 0.001 1.009 
Insurance 9576.835 0.001 1.069 Insurance 1707.796 0.001 1.089 
Education 1838.736 0.001 1.080 Education 855.572 0.001 1.095 
NP Status 53461.41 0.001 1.049 
Table 15b: Art Industry Coefficients 
Variables 
of Model 
FP Art 
Wage Coefficient 
Significance 
level VIF 
 Variables 
of Model 
NP Art 
Wage Coefficient 
Significance 
level VIF 
Age 0.86 0.342 1.005 Age 1.94 0.001 1.005 
Race -179.264 0.001 1.023 Race 9.926 0.001 1.023 
Sex -1256.154 0.001 1.009 Sex -52.426 0.591 1.010 
Insurance 396.198 0.001 1.069 Insurance 154.642 0.005 1.069 
Education -18.917 0.001 1.080 Education 18.668 0.001 1.081 
NP Status 53461.41 0.001 1.049 
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Table 15c: Nursing Industry Coefficients 
Variables 
of Model 
FP 
Nursing 
Wage Coefficient 
Significance 
level VIF 
 Variables 
of Model 
NP 
Nursing 
Wage Coefficient 
Significance 
level VIF 
Age 10.345 0.001 1.005 Age 4.518 0.001 1.006 
Race 724.275 0.001 1.023 Race 12.057 0.654 1.023 
Sex 1048.791 0.001 1.009 Sex -105.383 0.001 1.010 
Insurance 749.628 0.001 1.069 Insurance 426.723 0.001 1.069 
Education -141.766 0.001 1.080 Education 61.139 0.001 1.082 
NP Status 53461.41 0.001 1.049 
 
Table 15d: Individual Service Industry Coefficients 
Variables 
of Model 
FP 
Individual 
Service Coefficient 
Significance 
level VIF 
 Variables 
of Model 
NP 
Individual 
Service Coefficient 
Significance 
level VIF 
Age 12.817 0.001 1.005 Age 7.329 0.001 1.005 
Race 830.698 0.001 1.023 Race 54.789 0.108 1.023 
Sex 34.558 0.527 1.009 Sex -187.596 0.001 1.009 
Insurance 483.545 0.001 1.069 Insurance 712.93 0.001 1.069 
Education 101.781 0.001 1.080 Education 99.879 0.001 1.082 
NP Status 53461.41 0.001 1.049 
 
Table 15e: Community Service Industry Coefficients  
Variables of 
Model FP 
Community 
Service Coefficient 
Significan
ce level VIF 
 Variables 
of Model 
NP 
Communit
y Service Coefficient 
Significanc
e level VIF 
Age 
0.293 
0.337 
1.00
5 Age 
-0.574 0.115 1.006 
Race 
48.286 
0.001 
1.02
3 Race 
-21.117 0.096 1.023 
Sex 
-64.964 
0.001 
1.00
9 Sex 
-33.073 0.01 1.009 
Insurance 
13.337 
0.200 
1.06
9 Insurance 
133.73 
0.001 
1.069 
Education 
-0.705 
0.654 
1.08
0 Education 
12.76 
0.001 
1.080 
NP Status 53461.41 0.001 1.049 
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Table 15f: Childcare Industry Coefficients 
Variables 
of Model 
FP 
Childcare Coefficient 
Significanc
e level VIF 
 Variables 
of Model 
NP 
Childcare Coefficient 
Significanc
e level VIF 
Age -17.471 0.001 1.005 Age 4.873 0.001 1.006 
Race 233.19 0.001 1.023 Race 101.875 0.001 1.023 
Sex 816.379 0.001 1.009 Sex -3.579 0.839 1.014 
Insurance -627.371 0.001 1.069 Insurance 146.867 0.001 1.069 
Education -15.064 0.003 1.080 Education 31.454 0.001 1.080 
NP Status 53461.41 0.001 1.049 
 
 
Table 15g: Publishing Industry Coefficients 
Variables 
of Model 
FP 
Publishing Coefficient 
Significanc
e level VIF 
 Variables 
of Model 
NP 
Publishing Coefficient 
Significanc
e level VIF 
Age 1.932 0.354 1.005 Age 0.563 0.050 1.005 
Race -766.603 0.001 1.023 Race -8.731 0.384 1.023 
Sex -1969.915 0.001 1.009 Sex -32.699 0.001 1.009 
Insurance 718.815 0.001 1.069 Insurance 33.587 0.001 1.069 
Education 150.483 0.001 1.080 Education 4.087 0.006 1.080 
NP Status 53461.41 0.001 1.049 
 
Table 15h: Religious Industry Coefficients 
Variables of Model NP 
Religious Coefficient Significance level VIF 
Age -2.423 0.053 1.021 
Race 192.091 0.001 1.028 
Sex -2017.805 0.001 1.044 
Insurance 788.532 0.001 1.074 
Education 187.246 0.001 1.083 
NP Status 22617.584 0.001 1.067 
 
Therefore, what must be answered is what can be gained from this model set. 
Overall there is not much that can be distilled from this model set. The for profit industry 
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models did a poor job at explaining the data, while the non-profit models all did better 
than the pervious model set. What was also gained was further proof of mean wages of 
non-profits and for profits, which were in favor of the for profit industry; though they 
varied quite a bit between industries. Lastly, and perhaps most important to the thesis of 
this paper, is that the donative labor hypothesis and other intrinsic factors were proved to 
be present in all the industries sampled. What was somewhat odd was that neither had a 
negative coefficient like the theory predicted. Yet, this model shows that there needs to 
be an expansion of variables when looking at the industry level. 
 
Conclusion 
 What can be said of the results of the models? First and foremost is that 
proponents of the donative labor hypothesis are incorrect in assuming that the donative 
labor hypothesis is of ultimate importance in predicting non-profit wages. Even though in 
the test for the donative labor idea was statistically significant for the first two model sets, 
this was not enough to compensate for its failure to explain 50 percent of the data in 
model set three. Further, in model set four, the donative labor hypothesis was shown to be 
significant, explaining more at an industry level, but failing to have the correct 
coefficients. 
 Second, the framework of all the models had some very important drawbacks. 
The primary drawback is that all of the models exhibited heteroskedasticity, which leads 
to the possibility of the standard errors, and ultimately the significance test, being biased. 
Further, the models do not incorporate information that articulates worker satisfaction. 
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This is important because, if there was a more specific way of getting at this information, 
it would allow for a more adequate evaluation of the donative labor hypotheses. 
Therefore leading to the conclusion that there needs to be an effort to collect more data or 
proxies on intrinsic utility increasing aspects of jobs. 
Finally, it is important to discuss where to go from this point. Empirical studies 
such as this one cannot give the ultimate truth about this topic. Moreover, they should be 
taken as a litmus test telling scholars if the theory is heading in the right or wrong 
direction.  We can see from this paper is that the direction being taken is sound and 
shows the usefulness of the ACS PUMS data survey, a completely new data system. 
Since DataFerrette was in its initial release phases when this research was done, it can be 
expected that using DataFerrette will become more useful to researchers in the future. 
Perhaps the best way to take this paper is as a method for how wage differential studies 
should be done in the future: with more variables, testing for both of the theories, and an 
eye to looking at the economy as a whole in addition to industry level results.  
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